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Abstract
This paper examines the conditions allowing for the formation of aeropolitan ar-
eas as large industrial areas with a high concentration of commercial activities in the
proximity of cargo airports. When rms deliver part of their production by plane, land
competition takes place among service operators, rms and farmers. Service operators
supply facilities that rms can take advantage of. Our framework allows selecting a sta-
ble land equilibrium: the spatial sequence Airport-Industrial Park-Rural Area (A-I-R).
Aerotropolis-type congurations arise around cargo airports when there is an intense
use of the airport by the rms and a su¢ ciently high level of facilities.
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1 Introduction
Logistics become an increasing important issue because rms need to be even more exible.
Speed and agility are already as important as price and quality for rms that adopt just-
in-time strategies. Firms choose their location to enhance their accessibility to markets.
Logistics are not longer seen as costs to be minimized, but as value-added activities that
need to be optimized. Quoting Mr. Lueck (AMB vice president and asset manager):
"You can have the best product, the best R&D and the best marketing, but
if you cant get your product to the user through the supply chain e¢ ciently,
you will lose... Logistics are a value link in the supply chain, providing more
than a way to move a box from here to there".
Fast delivery is a key element (see Leinbach and Bowen, 2004 for empirical evidence).
Airports are seen (especially by e-tailers) as a new kind of Central Business District (CBD)
with enough capacity to leverage air commerce into high prots. In that spirit, Kasarda
(2000) introduced for the rst time the idea of aerotropolis (airport city), namely a large
industrial area characterized by a high concentration of commercial activities in the area
surrounding certain cargo airports. Arend et al. (2004) assess that aerotropoli may extend
up to 32 kilometers (20 miles), including a number of activities and infrastructures such
as retail and distribution centers, light industrial parks, o¢ ce and research parks, districts
zoned for specic purposes, foreign trade zones, entertainment and conference facilities and
even residential developments that contribute substantially to the competitiveness of rms
belonging to this area.
This paper analyzes the conditions allowing for the formation of aeropolitan areas by
studying the distribution of commercial activities around an airport. In order to achieve
this goal, we ascertain the land sharing process among di¤erent agents in the surroundings
of an airport that can be either passenger or cargo.
Glaeser and Kahn (2004) suggest studying these phenomena by comparing the di¤erent
degrees of land-plot occupation by using a concentration measure as density. Their original
setting focuses on the analysis of urban sprawl, and refers to the spreading of employment
and population in a metropolitan area as well as its concentration in living and working
areas. Land equilibrium is driven by the value each type of agent pegs to a land plot at
each possible distance from the center. Starting from the model for the location of divisible
activities developed by Von-Thünen (1826), various models have tried to explain the con-
guration of cities where households commute to the CBD and form urban agglomerations
around it.1 As pointed out by Fujita and Thisse (2002), the novelty of Von-Thünen is to
1See Fujita and Thisse (2002) for a complete overview of the evolution of this literature in the economics
of agglomeration.
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introduce the notion of bid-rent function: land is not homogeneous and is assigned to the
highest bidder. A piece of land at a particular location can be associated with a commodity
whose price is not xed by the market supply and demand. According to Alonso (1964),
who adopted the Von-Thünen agricultural model to an urban context, the rent each agent
can bid at each location is explained by the savings in transport costs with respect to a
more distant site. Hence, land gives rise to a spatial heterogeneity and agents stop bidding
for the most distant land since no further savings can be enjoyed.2 Fujita and Thisse (2002)
prove that the spatial heterogeneity generated by an exogenous center (the CBD) allows
escape from the Spatial Impossibility Theorem.3
This study grants most of its features to urban theory. In that spirit, we consider
how commercial rms, service operators and farmers compete for land. By service opera-
tors we are referring to all rms developing activities associated to the use of the airport.
Service operators provide aviation and non-aviation services to commercial rms. Avia-
tion services account for air transportation activities whereas non-aviation services include a
number of complementary services (e.g. freighter docks, bonded warehouse, mechanical han-
dling, refrigerated storage, fresh meat inspection, mortuary, animal quarantine, livestock
handling, health o¢ cials, security for valuables, decompression chamber, express/courier
center, equipment for dangerous and radioactive goods, large or heavy cargo etc.).4
Although we adopt the basic features of general urban models, we extend the analysis
to consider the easiness with which rms have access to certain facilities (for their activity)
as a further variable a¤ecting the agent location choice. Our setting is simple. There is a
group of service operators supplying a range of services in the proximity of an airport, and
rms need to settle close enough to enjoy them. The spatial concentration of these services
in the proximity of an airport prevents rms from wasting time in searching for the most
suitable ones and reduces their operative costs. Therefore, proximity to the airport allows
rms to benet from an easy access to many facilities (supplied by service operators) also
letting them reduce their operating costs. In such a way, rms gain speed in delivering their
products and increase the value-added of their activity increase. We model the accessibility
to these facilities as an intangible asset that partially reduces rms operative costs and
whose exploitation is strongly associated with location (in the spirit of Chipman, 1970).
The idea of introducing an intangible asset (or an externality) as a further force driving
agent location choices is not new. There are other studies stressing the importance of ex-
2Empirical evidence can be found in Muto (2006).
3Spatial Impossibility Theorem: there is no competitive equilibrium involving transportation in a two-
region economy with a nite number of consumers and rms; homogeneous space; costly transport; and
preferences locally non-satiated (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, pp. 35).
4See www.azworldairports.com for important non-aviation services provided in the major worldwide air-
ports.
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ternalities in determining urban patterns. We recall the study by Brueckner et al. (1997) in
which the relative location of income groups depend on the spatial distribution of amenities
in a city; as well as the contribution by Cavailhès et al. (2004) explaining the presence of
periurban belts around cities (occupied by both households and farmers) as a consequence
of the choice of households to live in the same area as farmers since they value the rural
amenities created by farming activities.
Finally, another distinguishing feature in our framework is the presence of transport
costs as a quadratic function of the Euclidean distance from each location to an exogenous
xed central business district (CBD). Our idea is to replicate a setting in which the ex-
ploitation of the intangible benets (advantages) is strongly associated with location. With
regards to a rms distance from the CBD, the impact of those benets becomes small, but
the decline of the impact is progressive (and not proportional) with the distance.5
The main result of the paper is that aeropolitan areas arise around cargo airports when
rms use air commerce services intensively and the level of facilities generated by service
operators is su¢ ciently high. In addition, the model predicts smaller cargo airports relative
to passenger airports.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical evidence moti-
vating the analysis. Section 3 presents the model, introduces the equilibrium analysis and
isolates the required conditions for aeropolitan areas to arise. Section 4 provides some case
studies supporting the theoretical results and, nally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence for the importance of air transport in
order to support certain assumptions regarding the framework we develop.6
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) estimates that about 4:5% of
the world GDP may be attributed to air transport and its e¤ects upon industries providing
either aviation-specic inputs or consumer products. In simple terms, every US $100 of
output produced and every 100 jobs created by air transport trigger additional demand of
US $325 and in turn 610 jobs in other industries. The total economic contribution of air
transport can be measured by looking at the employment and income e¤ects derived from
its direct economic activities on the one hand, and from its indirect and induced activities
5 In this respect, empirical evidence can be found in Henderson (2003) or Glaeser and Kahn (2004).
6We would like to thank M. Serret (IMADE, Spain), The Alava Development Agency (Spain), E. Maniecki
(Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Cologne, Germany), The Frankfurt RhineMain Economic Promo-
tion Board Region (Germany), M.V. Cicogna (ENAC, Italy), W. Küstner (Wirtschaftsfoerderung Region
Stuttgart GmbH, Germany) for data and information provided.
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(better known as the multiplier e¤ect) on the other hand. As one can expect, most of these
employment and income e¤ects take place at a regional level, and they are higher than
at a national one. They also vary substantially from airport to airport depending on the
relationship between the rms and service operators.7
The concept of aerotropolis (a large industrial area characterized by a high concentra-
tion of commercial activities in the surroundings of some cargo airports) derives from a
renement of the study of the economic e¤ects induced by an airport in its surroundings. It
is relatively new. Some aerotropolis projects already exist and others are under construc-
tion. Arend et al. (2004) mention several examples of aerotropolis. Amsterdam-Shiphol
(AMS) is one of the best examples of mature aerotropolis since it is surrounded by logistic
and o¢ ce parks; merchandise marts; hotels and entertainment complexes; and there is rail
service to Amsterdam, other important cities in Western Europe and major logistic centers.
The cases of Memphis (MEM) and Louisville (SDF) in United States; and the cases of Köln-
Bonn (CLG) and Vitoria-Foronda (VIT) in Europe (Germany and Spain, respectively) are
also the center of well-established aeropolitan areas. Conversely, Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW)
is one of the clearest examples of aerotropolis under construction. Particularly, to the east
of the airport, the "Las Colinas" area is expanding to accommodate 790; 000 sqm of light
industrial space, 121; 000 sqm of retail, 13; 000 family homes, 3; 700 hotel rooms and more
than 75 restaurants. Companies such as AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, Exxon, Abbot Laborato-
ries, GTE or Microsoft are already there (Kasarda, 2000). Another example of aerotropolis
under construction is the logistically integrated area "PLAZA" in Zaragoza (Spain).8
Given the commercial orientation underpinning an aerotropolis, it is fairly intuitive
to think of aerotropoli developing around cargo airports. In Europe, the specialization
between cargo and passenger airports is less pronounced since the major cargo airports are
also prominent in passenger activities.
Although any airport can develop both cargo and passenger activities, they are usu-
ally classied into two categories (cargo or passenger) by looking at the dominant nature
of their operations (see Airports Council International for quantitative statistics). For in-
stance, Memphis (MEM) and Louisville (SDF) are usually classied as cargo airports. They
are air-express "mega-hubs" since they are the air base of FedEx and UPS, respectively.
Consequently e-tailers that normally work in partnership with FedEx and UPS have strong
incentives to settle close to these airports.9
7Referring to ICAO circular (2004) for a few quantitative data.
8Data can be obtained at www.plazadosmil.com.
9For instance, Barnesandnoble.com, Planetrx.com, Toysrus.com or Williamsonoma.com are located at
MEM; whereas and Nike.com, Drugemporiun.com or Gess.com are located at SDF surroundings.
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3 The model
The building blocks of our model are substantially based on Cavailhès et al. (2004) and
Fujita and Thisse (2002).
Space is represented by the real line X = ( 1;1) with the central business district
(CBD) lying at the origin. The CBD is an exogenous xed point and this corresponds to
the airport terminals. We dene any spatial distance from it as x 2 X , with x > 0.
There are three types of agents competing for land: (i) a continuum of identical service
operators of mass Na and density na(x)  0 at x 2 X ; (ii) a continuum of identical rms
of mass Ni and density ni(x)  0 at x 2 X; and (iii) a continuum of farmers of mass Nf
density nf (x)  0 at x 2 X, characterized by bidding a xed (agricultural) rent Rf . Land
is nite and the total area occupied by service operators, rms and farmers at each x 2 X
is xed and normalized to 1 (as in Cavailhès et al., 2004):
na(x)Sa(x) + ni(x)Si(x) + nf (x)Sf (x) = 1. (1)
Sa(x), Si(x) and Sa(x) stand for the sizes of land plots and na(x)Sa(x), ni(x)Si(x) and
nf (x)Sf (x) denote the total amount of land being used by each type of agent at a certain
location x 2 X.
Both service operators and rms maximize prots by choosing their optimal land plot
at each location x 2 X. The economy is assumed to be open and agents make zero prots
and can freely move. Land is assigned to the highest bidder and therefore land equilibrium
is driven by the value each type of agent pegs to a land plot at a each possible distance from
the airport center. We dene an Airport space (A) as a specialized-service operator area
(i.e. na(x) > 0 and ni(x) = nf (x) = 0); an Industrial Park (I) as a specialized-rm area
(i.e. ni(x) > 0 and na(x) = nf (x) = 0); and nally a Rural Area (R) as an area where only
farmers live (i.e. nf (x) > 0 and na(x) = ni(x) = 0). The relative positions of the areas A,
I and R with respect to the CBD are endogenously determined by the bid-rent functions
obtained at equilibrium.10
Airports can be classied into two categories: cargo and passenger. Since there are
some structural features distinguishing the two categories of airports, we present each case
separately. A comparison between the equilibrium in the two scenarios allows detecting the
conditions that guarantee the existence of an aerotropolis.
10A basic approach to the concept of bid-rent function can be found in Zenou (2005).
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3.1 The Cargo airport
First, we concentrate on the cargo case by thinking of an airport endowed with a specic
infrastructure devoted to cargo activities.
3.1.1 The rms maximization behavior
A rm located at x 2 X produces a quantity of good equal to qi(x). We assume that rms
have to deliver by plane a proportion  of their production, i.e. qci (x) is the quantity of
goods delivered through the airport where qci (x) = qi(x) and  2 (0; 1). Firms obtain a
net price p for each unit of good they sell and have to pay d (airport tari¤) for each unit of
the production they deliver by plane with p; d  0.
Firms benet from complementary services generated by service operators. In the airport
neighborhood, the agglomeration of service operators provides a range of facilities that
increase rmsspeed and agility in delivering goods thus improving their competitiveness.11
We model this situation by explicitly introducing the ease of access to facilities as an element
reducing the costs that rms incur in delivering through the airport. Its value at x 2 X
is represented by Ai(x); it is associated with rm location and the land plot of all service
operators (SA(x)) at x 2 X:
Ai(x) =
SA(x)
tx2
, (2)
where ; t > 0. Hence, these benets depend positively (via the parameter ) on the overall
land occupied by service operators settle (i.e. the size of the airport), while they melt
with the distance from the airport terminals.12 In order to capture this feature, transport
costs are dened as a quadratic function of the Euclidean distance from the CBD (tx2).13
Therefore, Ai(x) is modeled as an intangible asset smoothing the aviation-service cost of
rms (dqci (x)).
However, as shown by the empirical evidence, rms demand both aviation and non-
aviation services (which include a number of complementary services) from service opera-
tors.14 Bi(x) captures the non-aviation expenditures of a rm located at x 2 X. Finally,
11For instance, Leinbach and Bowen (2004) provide a complete study of this phenomenon for the case of
Singapore-Changi (SIN).
12This expression embodies the simulataneous importance that rms confer to externalities as well as
being close to the airport center.
13Empirical evidence can be found in Henderson (2003) and Glaeser and Kahn (2004).
14Even if non-aviation revenues are not the principal source of earnings for service operators, the report by
ICAO (2004) argues that they are progressively increasing. This trend coincides with the present entrepre-
neurial creativity of service operators in generating non-aviation revenues and improving customer services
by providing a wide range of complementary facilities. One can easily realize the importance of non-aviation
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rms have to pay a land rent Ri(x). Therefore, the prot function for a rm located at
x 2 X is:
i(x) = pqi(x) Ri(x)Si(x)  dq
c
i (x)
Ai(x)
 Bi(x). (3)
Firmsproduction function takes the form qi(x) = Si(x) ,15 where  stands for the elasticity
of production with respect to rms plot size and  2 (0; 1), i.e. rms have decreasing returns
in land size. There is a competition race for land plots between the di¤erent group of agents.
Firms have an interest in land and we assume that the elasticity of their production with
respect to the land is quite high.
Non-aviation expenditures are determined by:
Bi(x) =

x
(tx2) = tx, (4)
with  > 0. Bi(x) is composed of two elements:

x represents the degree of use of non-
aviation services (decreasing with distance), and the transportation costs (tx2).
By replacing (2) and (4) into (3), we obtain the objective function that rms maximize
with respect to Si(x):
Max
Si(x)
pSi(x)
  Ri(x)Si(x)  dq
c
i (x)
SA(x)
tx2
  tx
The result of the maximization program yields the following optimal land plot for a rm
located at x 2 X:
Si (x) =
0@(p  dtx2SA(x))
Ri(x)
1A 11  . (5)
Assumption 1 :
p >
dtx2
SA(x)
=) pqi(x) > dq
c
i (x)
Ai(x)
,
activities even in liabilities since these activities convey relatively expensive cost of maintenance for the
logistical infrastructure (ICAO, 2004 and Passatore, 1998).
15This function can be interpreted as a reduced form of a standard Cobb-Douglas function with a second
input normalized to one.
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i.e. for any rm at x 2 X, gross prots (namely before using the airport) are greater
than aviation costs. Therefore, Si (x) is always positive.
Competition for land among rms implies that they make zero prots. The zero prots
condition leads to:
Ri (x) =

1  
tx
 1 



p  dtx
2
SA(x)
 1

, (6)
where Ri (x) is the bid-rent function for rms, i.e. the highest price a rm is willing to pay
for a piece of land at x 2 X.
By plugging (6) into (5) we obtain:
Si (x) =
0@ tx
(1  )

p  dtx2SA(x)

1A 1 :
Since service operators are identical, the size of the airport can be written as SA(x) =
NaSa(x). Hence,
Si (x) =
0@ tx
(1  )

p  dtx2NaSa(x)

1A 1 (7)
The service operatorsoptimization problem needs to be solved in order to obtain the values
for Si (x) and R

i (x) and to analyze the land equilibrium.
Each service operator maximizes the following prot function:
a(x) =
(d  c)Qc(x)
Na
+Ba(x) Ra(x)Sa(x), (8)
where d is the airport tari¤ paid by rms, c the operating unit cost service operators have
to bear and d > c > 0. Finally, Ba(x) are the non-aviation prots and Ra(x) the land rent
for a service operator located at x 2 X.16
16As pointed out in ICAO (2004) and Passatore (1998), each airport balance sheet is characterized by this
double source of revenues: aviation and non-aviation services. We mention a few examples. According to
Passatore (1998), the 1996 revenues of the Stuttgart Airport (STR) can be split into 73% corresponding to
aviation and 27% to non-aviation income, while the total income of Frankfurt-Main (FRA) was composed
of 66% aviation and 34% non-aviation revenues.
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The overall industry production delivered through the airport can be written as Qc(x) =
Niq
c
i (x) because rms are identical. Since q
c
i (x) = Si(x)
 then,
Qc(x) = NiSi(x)
 . (9)
The non-aviation prots earned by a service operator take this form:
Ba(x) =

x
Sa(x), (10)
i.e. they depend on the rmsdegree of use of non-aviation services (x ) and on the size of
the service operator supplying the service.
By plugging (7) into (9) and both (9) and (10) into (8) we obtain the objective function
that service operators maximize with respect to Sa(x):
Max
Sa(x)
(d  c)NiSi(x)
Na
+

x
Sa(x) Ra(x)Sa(x),
s:t: Si(x) = S

i (x) =
 
tx
(1 )

p  dtx2
NaSa(x)

! 1

.
This result yields the following optimal value:
Sa(x) =

k(x)dtx2

x
 Ra(x)
 1
2
+ dtx2
pNa
, (11)
where k(x) = Ni(d c)tx(1 ) .
Assumption 2

x
> Ra(x),
i.e. the non-aviation prots obtained by a service operator are higher than the value
of the land rent it has to pay at a given location x 2 X. Therefore, Sa(x) is always
positive.
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As before, the zero prots condition leads to:
Rea(x) =

x

1  Ni(d  c)
d(1  )

, (12)
where Rea(x) is the equilibrium bid-rent function for service operators, i.e. the highest price
a service operator is willing to pay for a piece of land at x 2 X.
Assumption 3 Let Ni(d c)d(1 )  1, then Rea(x)  0.
By plugging (12) into (11) we obtain the equilibrium land size:
Sea(x) =
2dtx2
Nap
. (13)
The equilibrium rm size and bid-rent function are obtained by plugging (13) into (6)
and (7):
Rei (x) =

1  
tx
 1 


p
2
 1

, (14)
and
Sei (x) =

2tx
(1  )p
 1

. (15)
At equilibrium, one can observe that for both rms and service operators land rent decreases
in x because land loses its value as agentsdistance from the CBD increases. Consequently,
land size increases in x since lower rents allow agents to occupy larger plots.
At equilibrium, Assumptions 1 and 2 are always satised (see Appendix B).17 All rms
in the industrial area enjoy the same amount of facilities, which can be obtained by plugging
(13) into (2):
Aei =
2d
p
.
17Therefore, the only parameter constraint comes from Assumption 3.
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The higher the proportion of production rms deliver by plane (), the lower the price with
respect to the service operatorstari¤ (pd), and the more rms are able to enjoy facilities.
Finally, since it is assumed that farmers take the residual land, Sef (x) is determined by
(1):
Sef (x) =
1
nf (x)
(1 na(x)Sea(x) ni(x)Sei (x)) = 1nf (x)(1 na(x)
2dtx2
Nap
 ni(x)

2tx
(1 )p
 1

),
and they pay a constant (agricultural) rent (Ref (x) = R
e
f ) for this.
3.1.2 Equilibrium analysis
At equilibrium, the highest bidder obtains the use of the land, i.e. Re(x) = max

Rea(x); R
e
i (x); R
e
f
	
.
Proposition 1 In the neighborhood of a cargo airport, there are two possible (not triv-
ial) land equilibrium congurations: I-A-R (Industrial park-Airport-Rural area), and A-I-R
(Airport-Industrial park-Rural area).
Proof.
1. R
e
f < min fRea(x); Rei (x)g has to hold at equilibrium because otherwise either the
service operators or the rms (or both) get no land.
2. For any  2 (0; 1) with  6= 12 , both Rea(x) and Rei (x) are decreasing and convex and
cross only once at x = xA  [ (1  (d c)Nid(1 ) )(2p)
1
 ( t1  )
1 
 ]

2 1 (see Appendix A for
the proof of the single-crossing condition).
(a) If  < 12 , then R
e
a(x) < R
e
i (x) for 8 x < xA and the land equilibrium turns out
to be I-A-R.
(b) If  > 12 , then R
e
a(x) > R
e
i (x) for 8 x < xA and the correspondent land equilib-
rium is A-I-R.
The size of rm land plot a¤ects the total quantity of good supplied by the rms them-
selves. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume a relatively high elasticity of rmsproduction
with respect to plot size. Under this assumption and according to Proposition 1, the fol-
lowing Corollary holds.
Corollary 1 Under the realistic assumption of a relatively high elasticity of rmsproduc-
tion with respect to plot size, the land equilibrium is formed by the sequence A-I-R.
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In this case the CBD turns out to be the centre of the airport. An A-I-R-type land
equilibrium is presented in Figure 1 below.18
Figure 1: The A-I-R Land Equilibrium
Distance xA xes the limit of A and xI bounds the I area. At the equilibrium, the land
plots are assigned to the highest bidder group (namely, service operators, rms or farmers)
and, as a consequence, land appears to be fully specialized. Therefore,
Z xA
0
na(x)dx = Na
and
Z xI
xA
ni(x)dx = Ni. Moreover, since no land is vacant, na(x) = 1Sea(x) for all x < xA;
and ni(x) = 1Sei (x)
for all x 2 (xA; xI).
18Figure 3 is drawn by selecting the following paramenters:  = 2
3
, t = 3
10
,  = 2, d = 4, c = 1, Ni = 13 ,
p = 6,  = 1.
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This result is mainly driven by the maximization behavior of the two groups of agents.
On one hand, rms care enough about their land-plot size (i.e.  > 12) because their
revenues rely on it; but they also care about service operatorsland plot for the facilities
they generate. On the other hand, service operators simply care about their own size. In
this framework, the A-I-R land structure arises because service operators try to settle close
enough to the airport so as benet from larger markets. Firms try to push service operators
close to the airport as much as possible in order to rent land space farther from the CBD,
since they are not willing to pay expensive rents for the small land plots surrounding the
CBD.
Corollary 2 At an A-I-R land equilibrium, the farmers bid-rent function is bounded from
above.
Proof. The A-I-R conguration requires xA < xI where xI  [( Ref )(
p
2)
1
 (1 t )
1 
 ]

1  .
This condition leads to R
e
f < R
MAX
f  [(p2 )

3 22 1 (1 t )
1
2 1 ( 1
(1  Ni(d c)
d(1 ) )
)
1
 ]1  and
therefore, the farmers bid-rent function cannot be higher than a given threshold.
3.2 The Passenger airport
We mostly replicate the analysis performed for the cargo case. For sake of simplicity, we
maintain the same notation for parameters, while we add primes to variables to distinguish
these from the previous case, but still keeping the same meaning.
3.2.1 The rms maximization behavior
The aviation services supplied by service operators are mainly addressed to passenger trans-
port and, marginally, to cargo activity. Cargo activity is considered by service operators as
a by-product of their passenger operations. Firms total (q0i(x)) at x 2 X) production can
be split into two parts and only a proportion () is delivered by plane. As a consequence,
the prot function for a rm located at x 2 X turns out to be:
0i(x) = p

q0i(x) + (1  )q0i(x)
 R0i(x)S0i(x)  dq0i(x)A0i(x)  B0i(x), (16)
We assume that the share of products delivered by air transport () is supplied on a marginal
cost basis, i.e. q0i(x)(p  dA0i(x))! 0 or equivalently A
0
i(x)! dp and, hence, (16) reduces to:
0i(x) = (1  )pq0i(x) R0i(x)S0i(x) B0i(x). (17)
Equation (17) shows that rm prots are independent from the airport size (S0A(x)). Hence,
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rmsmaximization program can be computed irrespective of service operatorsdecisions.
(with q0i(x) = S
0
i(x)
) :
Max
S0i(x)
(1  )pS0i(x)  R0i(x)S0i(x) B0i(x).
Firms maximization with respect to S0i(x) yields the following optimal land plot:
S0i (x) =

(1  )p
R0i(x)
 1
1 
. (18)
By applying the zero prots condition, we obtain the equilibrium bid-rent function for
rms:
R0ei (x) =

1  
tx
 1 

[(1  )p] 1 . (19)
Finally, the equilibrium plot size for rms is obtained by plugging (19) into (18):
S0ei (x) =

tx
(1  )(1  )p
 1

. (20)
Moving to service operators, each of them maximizes the following prot function:
0a(x) =
(d  c)
Na
(T + 
Q0(x)
S0A(x)
) +B0a(x) R0a(x)S0a(x), (21)
where (d c)Na (T + 
Q0(x)
S0A(x)
) captures aviation prots coming from passenger transportation.
Service operators located in the proximity of a passenger airport center specialize in services
addressed to passenger tra¢ c. More precisely, T refers to prots issuing from tourist trans-
port,  Q
0(x)
S0A(x)
refers to the earnings related to business trips with  > 0, and (d  c) stands
for the net benet per passenger. Prots associated with business trips depend on the in-
tensity of the airport use Q
0(x)
S0A(x)
, which is measured as a trade-o¤ between the dynamism of
the region (the more active, the more business trips) and the size of the airport.19 As in
19 In that sense, a small airport in a very active region yields a high intensity of airport use and hence high
prots related to business trips.
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the cargo case, commercial rms and service operators are homogeneous (with mass Ni and
Na, respectively), hence Q0(x) = Niq0i(x) = NiS
0
i(x)
 and S0A(x) = NaS
0
a(x). Since cargo
activities are considered by service operators as a by-product of their passenger operations
(i.e. a complementary facility), they are included in non-aviation prots (B0a(x) =

xS
0
a(x)).
The maximization program is:
Max
S0a(x)
(d  c)
Na
(T + 
Q0(x)
S0A(x)
) +B0a(x) R0a(x)S0a(x)
s:t: Q0(x) = NiS0i(x)
 , S0A(x) = NaS
0
a(x).
Service operator maximization with respect to S0a(x) yields the following optimal land
plot size (and by considering (20):
S0a (x) =
 
(d  c)txNi
(1  )(1  )pN2a (x  R0a(x))
! 1
2
. (22)
Finally, one can obtain the equilibrium bid-rent function and plot size for a service operator:
R0ea (x) =

x
"
1 

T
2
2 (d  c)(1  )(1  )p
Nit
#
, (23)
and
S0ea (x) =
2Nitx
NaT (1  )(1  )p . (24)
In the passenger case, Assumption 2 holds as in the cargo case to guarantee a positive land
plot for service operators. Conversely, we need to redene Assumption 3.
Assumption 30 Let

T
2
2
(d c)(1 )(1 )p
Nit
 1, then R0ea (x)  0.
As in the cargo case, land rent decreases in distance (x) and land size increases in x.
At equilibrium, Assumption 2 is fullled and the only constraint comes from Assumption
30. Finally, farmers take the residual land:
S0ef (x) =
1
n0f (x)
(1  n0a(x)S0ea (x)  n0i(x)S0ei (x)) =
= 1nf (x)

1  na(x)

2Nitx
NaT (1 )(1 )p

  n0i(x)

tx
(1 )(1 )p
 1


, and they pay for it a
constant rent (R0ef (x) = R
0e
f ).
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3.2.2 Equilibrium analysis
Proposition 2 In the neighborhood of a passenger airport, there are two stable land equi-
libria: I-A-R and A-I-R.
Proof. See Proof of Proposition 1. Nevertheless, here, R0ea (x) and R0ei (x) cross at x = x
0
A 
[ 
((1 )p)
1


1 

T
2
2
(1 )(1 )(d c)p
Nit

( t1  )
1 
 ]

2 1 for any  2 (0; 1) with  6= 12 (see
Appendix A for proof of the single-crossing condition).
Again, Corollary 1 still holds and we may select the A-I-R equilibrium as the most
suitable.
Both in the cargo and passenger cases, the land equilibrium implies an A-I-R cong-
uration. Nevertheless, the two structures are not identical and the distinguishing features
of the A and I regions di¤er in the two scenarios (due to the di¤erent crossing points). A
comparison between the equilibrium in the cargo and the passenger settings allows detecting
the conditions that guarantee the existence of an aerotropolis.
3.3 The formation of an aerotropolis: the cargo and passenger cases
After computing of the equilibrium conditions, we focus on the determinants of an aerotropo-
lis area:
Denition 1 By aerotropolis we are referring to a relatively large industrial park in the
proximity of an airport, endowed with a relatively high concentration of rms.
According to this denition, we need to determine which of our two settings (passenger or
cargo airport) can fulll the two previous conditions, making aerotropoli structures possible.
To that end, we need to concentrate on the following two criteria:
 Space dimension: (xI   xA) Q (x0I   x0A).
 Firm density: ni(x) Q n0i(x).
Lemma 1 When  > 12 , in case of a cargo airport:
i) the capacity of rms to enjoy facilities is higher than in the passenger scenario (Aei > A
e0
i );
ii) rms are willing to pay a higher land rent (Rei (x) > R
0e
i (x)) and they obtain a smaller
land plot (Sei (x) < S
0e
i (x)).
Proof.
i) Easy access to facilities enjoyed by rms in the two scenarios are Aei =
2d
p and A
e0
i =
d
p ;
respectively. Hence, Aei > A
e0
i holds for  >
1
2 .
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ii)

1 
tx
 1 


 p
2
 1
 >

1 
tx
 1 

 ((1  )p) 1 holds for  > 12 ; and

2tx
(1 )p
 1

<

tx
(1 )(1 )p
 1

holds for  > 12 :
The higher the proportion of production delivered by plane (), the more facilities
rms are able to absorb in the cargo scenario and hence, the Aei  Ae0i di¤erence increases.
Therefore, given a threshold for , the agglomeration of activities around cargo airports
implies gains in terms of speed, agility and complementarities that are valued by rms. In
this situation, rms are willing to pay a higher price for land plots in the case of a cargo
airport since they enjoy more facilities. Consequently, land plots are smaller.
Corollary 3 If Lemma 1 holds, industrial parks are denser in rms in the case of cargo
airports.
Proof. An industrial park is a specialized rm area where no land is vacant. Density is
given by ni(x) = 1Sei (x)
and n0i(x) =
1
S0ei (x)
in the cargo and passenger cases, respectively.
Hence Sei (x) < S
0e
i (x) implies ni(x) > n
0
i(x).
This result insists on the idea of higher agglomeration of activities around cargo airports.
Lemma 2 Let  >  :
i) service operators are willing to pay a lower land rent (Rea(x) < R
0e
a (x)), in the cargo
airport;
ii) the cargo is smaller than the passenger airport (xA < x0A),
with   ( d(1 )
Ni(d c)[2(1 )]
1

)

[2(1  )] 1   1 +

T
2
2
(1 )(1 )p(d c)
Nit

.
Proof.
i) x

1  Ni(d c)d(1 )

< x

1 

T
2
2
(1 )(1 )p(d c)
Nit

holds for  > 1  (T (1 )2Ni )2
dp(1 )
t .
ii) [ (1  (d c)Nid(1 ) )(2p)
1
 ( t1  )
1 
 ]

2 1 < [ 
((1 )p)
1


1 

T
2
2
(1 )(1 )(d c)p
Nit

( t1  )
1 
 ]

2 1
holds for  >  (expression in Lemma 2).
It can be ascertained that the second condition over  is more stringent (i.e.  > 1),
once Assumption 30 is fullled. More precisely,  > 1 holds for

T
2
2
(d c)(1 )(1 )p
Nit
 1,
which is true because it is exactly the condition imposed by Assumption 30. Finally, since
Assumption 3 xes an upper bound for  (i.e.  <   d(1 )(d c) ), we need to prove that the
interval    exists. It can be checked that  <  holds if

T
2
2
(d c)(1 )(1 )p
Nit
 1, which
is always true because it is exactly the condition imposed by Assumption 30.
Moving from a cargo to a passenger-airport setting, the dynamic of the interaction
between the two groups of agents does not change dramatically. The main di¤erence is
17
that, in presence of a passenger-type airport, rms do not care about service operators
land plot. This is the reason driving the result in Lemma 2. When rms enjoy facilities
from service operators (i.e.  > ) fairly substantially in the case of a cargo airport, one
important component of rmsstrategy is to let service operators occupy land plots in the
proximity of the CBD. In that sense, the competition for the land closest to the airport is
less erce and, hence, the rent bidden by service operators can be relatively lower in the
passenger case. In the proximity of a passenger airport, rms do not enjoy many benets
from the service operators. Therefore, they do not care about the size and the position
of service operators land plot, but they still care about the size of their own land plot.
They still prefer to be a little farther from the CBD than the service operators. The lack of
facilities makes rms less prone to pay high rents for their land plot, and since the bid-rent
function decreases with respect to distance from the CBD, rms choose to settle farther
away than the service operators. As a consequence, passenger-airport surface (composed by
the CBD and the land plot of service operators) is larger than that of cargo-airport surface.
Corollary 4 If Lemmas 1 and 2 hold, industrial areas are larger in the case of a cargo
airport.
Proof. For a given agricultural rent (i.e. Ref = R
0e
f ), we obtain xI > x
0
I because R
e
i (x) >
R0ei (x). Since xA < x
0
A, then (xI   xA) > (x0I   x0A).
Hence, industrial parks are denser and larger around a cargo airport.
Proposition 3 If Lemmas 1 and 2 hold, an aerotropolis arises surrounding a cargo airport,
because industrial parks are larger and denser, namely (xI   xA) > (x0I   x0A) and ni(x) >
n0i(x):
An aerotropolis is empirically dened as a large and dense industrial area located in
the surroundings of certain cargo airports where commercial activities concentrate. Our
analysis helps to identify the requirements for the emergence of aeropolitan areas. These
conditions are basically two: an intense use of the airport by the rms (a high ); and a
su¢ ciently high level of usage of facilities (a high ). When these conditions are fullled,
service operators value passenger airports more whereas rms value cargo airports more. In
addition, cargo airports are smaller than passenger airports and industrial areas are larger
and denser in rms in the presence of a cargo airport. Therefore, an aerotropolis arises. An
aerotropolis-type conguration is shown in Figure 2 below:20
20Figure 4 has been produced by selecting the following paramenters:  = 2
3
, t = 3
10
,  = 2, d = 4, c = 1,
Ni =
1
3
, p = 6,  = 1 (as in Figure 3) and  = 2,  = 6
11
, T = 3
4
.
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Figure 2: The Aerotropolis
This result is due to the interplay of the forces discussed above. In the cargo case,
rms allow service operators enjoy land plots very close to the CBD and the competitive
pressure reduces along with the distance from the CBD. At the same time, at equilibrium,
the easy access to facilities jointly with a low level of competition makes the average size
of the rms land plot larger between xI and xA, and, hence, increases the density of rms
(in the surroundings of a cargo) with respect to passenger airports.
4 A sample of case studies
In this section, we present certain case studies in order to provide some empirical support
to our theoretical results. Relying on the distinction between cargo and passenger airports,
a small sample of European airports is selected for both categories. A comparison between
19
them should give certain insights about the way to distinguish aerotropolis-type congura-
tions from other industrial areas.
The selected airports are: Madrid-Barajas (MAD), Vitoria-Foronda (VIT), and Köln-
Bonn (CLG). The rst two are Spanish and the third is German. On one hand, MAD
is a passenger-type airport. On the other hand, VIT and CLG are the most important
cargo-specializing airports in each country.21
Although MAD combines passenger and cargo activities, it can be labeled as passenger
airport by referring to the predominant nature of its operations. In 2004, MAD recorded
tra¢ c of 38:71 million passengers and 0:34 million linear metric tons of delivered goods. In
airports such as MAD, combination carriers (which transport both passengers and cargo)
are the type of companies that mainly operate.
CLG is the second busiest cargo hub in Germany immediately after Frankfurt (FRA),
and VIT is the third Spanish cargo airport after MAD and Barcelona (BCN). In 2004, CLG
recorded a tra¢ c of 8:4 million passengers and 0:6 million linear metric tons of delivered
goods; and VIT recorded a tra¢ c of 0:095 million passengers and 0:04 million linear metric
tons of delivered goods. These airports are the base for integrated carriers that provide
door-to-door express-delivery service. More precisely, FedEx and UPS operate in CLG,
whereas FedEx, DHL and TNT operate in VIT.
4.1 A-I-R space conguration
This subsection aims at developing an applied study on the land distribution around airports
in order to detect A-I-R land congurations.
 Vitoria-Foronda (VIT). The airport extends over an area of 150; 000 sqm in the
proximity of Vitorias industrial area. According to the information supplied by the
Alava Development Agency,22 the spatial distribution of activities follows this pattern:
21Data from Airport International (issue june/july 2005) for CLG; and Annual Report of AENA (2004)
for MAD and VIT.
22"Álava Agencia de Desarrollo" in Spanish. This agency is under the auspices of the Provincial Govern-
ment of Alava. Vitoria is the capital of the province of Alava (see www.alavaagenciadesarrollo.es).
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Figure 3: VIT (25 km around) Figure 4: VIT (40 km around)
Taking VIT airport as the reference point (i.e. the CBD) and focusing on the space
located within a radius of 25 km, the land distribution seems to adapt to the A-I-R
scheme 23 and the industrial parks surrounding VIT locate on average 13:12 km from
the airport. When we enlarge the radius to 40 km, new industrial agglomerations
appear and seem to be located closer to the town than the airport. Therefore, in case
of VIT, the A-I-R land equilibrium is observed approximately up to a radius of 25
km when considering the airport as CBD. When we consider a greater distance from
the CBD, the facilities sourcing from service operators smooth (see Henderson, 2003)
and we need to address other arguments in order to explain land conguration.
 Madrid-Barajas (MAD). This airport area sizes around 39; 000; 000 sqm.24 The
most striking feature of the surroundings of this airport is the high number of indus-
trial parks scattered randomly. This feature makes it di¢ cult to establish a clear-cut
space scheme. According to the data supplied by the Madrid Development Institute
(IMADE)25 and the Madrid Chamber of Commerce,26 the industrial parks surround-
ing MAD (within a radius of 25 km) locate on average at 14:13 km from the airport.
Within this radius, the spatial distribution of activities basically replicates the same
pattern as VIT (A-I-R spatial sequence). As the distance from the airport increases,
externalities decay and the spatial distribution becomes less clear.
23No analytical di¤erence is made between urban and rural areas since we are interested in rm (and not
household) agglomerations.
24This is the total working surface from January 2006. MAD airport recently expanded from 24; 000; 000
to 39; 000; 000 sqm.
25The IMADE ("Instituto Madrileño de Desarrollo" in Spanish) is under the auspices of the Regional
Government of Madrid (see www.imade.es).
26"Cámara de Madrid" (see http://www.camaramadrid.es/ ).
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Figure 5: MAD (25 km around) Figure 6: MAD (40 km around)
 Köln-Bonn (CLG). This is the second busiest cargo hub in Germany and lies ap-
proximately at the same distance from Köln and Bonn (around 15 km). The airport
extends over 450; 000 sqm and is characterized by a large number of industrial parks
surrounding it. There are around 90 parks including both the existing ones and those
under construction within a radius of 40 km, according to the data supplied by the
Cologne Chamber of Industry and Commerce.27
Figure 7: CLG (25 km around) Figure 8: CLG (40 km around)
Within a radius of 25 km, industrial parks are located on average at 15:56 km from
the airport, i.e. somewhat further than in the case of VIT and MAD. It is interesting
to compare the industrial distribution outlined in Figures 7 and 8. Within the smaller
27"Industrie-und Handelshammer zu Köln" (see www.ihk-koeln.de/index.jsp).
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radius, most of the industrial areas are located between the airport and the cities.
However, within the larger radius, the industrial distribution is more scattered and
some parks appear beyond the cities. In any event, the A-I-R land equilibrium seems
to hold in both scenarios.
4.2 Aerotropolis
An aerotropolis requires certain conditions for its development (in terms of  and ). It has
also been shown that cargo airports are smaller than passenger airports (i.e. xA < x0A) and
that industrial areas are larger and denser in rms in the presence of a cargo airport (i.e.
(xI   xA) > (x0I   x0A) and ni(x) > n0i(x)). Since it is known that the CLG and VIT sur-
roundings feature an aerotropolis-type conguration, it is interesting to ascertain whether
the conditions described before are fullled.
We divide the analysis into two parts by separately considering the case within 25 km
and 40 km from the airport center. The two following tables (1.A and 1.B) summarize the
observed data in order to determine the density of the industrial-park area.28
Airport Airport Extension (sqm) Weighted -Average Distance (km) Firm Density ( iPSi(x) )100
Proxy for SA Proxy for ni(x)
VIT 150; 000 13:12 0:008
MAD 39; 000; 000 14:13 0:007
CLG 450; 000 15:56 0:005
Table 1:A: VIT, MAD, and CLG surroundings (25 km around)
Airport Airport Extension (sqm) Weighted -Average Distance (km) Firm Density ( iPSi(x) )100
Proxy for SA Proxy for ni(x)
VIT 150; 000 14:72 0:006
MAD 39; 000; 000 25 0:005
CLG 450; 000 25:89 0:006
Table 1:B: VIT, MAD, and CLG surroundings (40 km around)
28Data sources: Alava Development Agency (VIT), IMADE and Madrid Chamber of Commerce (MAD)
and Cologne Chamber of Industry and Commerce (CLG).
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When considering at airport size, the size of cargo airports appears to be the smallest in
our sample. Conversely, the study of the weighted distance cannot provide a clear support to
the idea that the limit of an aerotropolis (as maximum distance from the airport) is higher
than the industrial space close to a passenger airport.29 The second column in Table 1:A
and 1:B does not provide clear information, because the distance does not seem to follow a
monotonic path with respect to the category of the airport. It is likely that this feature is
strongly related to the size of the airports basin of attraction that turns out to be strongly
associated with the geographical position of the airport in a country or region. Nevertheless,
more precise conclusions can be drawn with respect to the density of rms in aerotropolis
versus a standard industrial area. We proxy this by the number of rms settled (denoted by
i) with respect to the total surface of all industrial parks (
P
Si(x)). Again, a higher density
of rms seems to be detected in the cargo cases, conrming the distinguishing features of
aerotropolis schemes.30 In Spain, the VIT and MAD airports fully replicate our theoretical
results irrespective of the distance from the airport. The density of rms is always higher
in the case of the cargo (VIT) than passenger (MAD) airport and it decreases as far as the
distance of the airport increases.
The case of CLG is a bit di¤erent. We do not dispose of complete data for a German
passenger airport to make the same kind of comparison as for Spain. The magnitude of
the density of rms (as in both tables) is comparable to that of Spanish airports, but it
does not follow the same decreasing path. Again, this e¤ect may be due to the national or
local context in which CLG operates, and more generally to size e¤ects. The regional basin
served by CLG may be larger that of Vitoria and, hence, it is possible that the industrial
density is somewhat smaller than that of Vitoria. In fact, the weighted-average distance is
greater in CLG than in VIT. In addition, when we compare VIT and CLG in the case of
the larger distance (40 km), the value of the two densities turns out to be exactly the same.
5 Concluding remarks
The increasing importance of e-commerce leads to airports being considered as a new type
of Central Business District (CBD) with su¢ cient capacity to leverage air commerce into
high prots.31 This paper applies current urban theory for studying the spatial distribution
of activities around airports and provides some insights into the formation of aerotropoli.
Aerotropoli are dened as large industrial areas characterized by a high concentration of
29This is the average of distances for each industrial park with respect to the airport, weighted by the
relative number of rms belonging to each park.
30More detailed information on the number of parks (corresponding to 2004) can be found in Appendix
C. Nevertheless, the index of density is computed by excluding those parks that were either not active or
were under construction by the end of 2004.
31...these days the magnets for business are airports...airports are becoming the centres of cities of their
own(The Economist 24/11/2005).
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commercial activities in the surroundings of certain cargo airports.
Land competition around airports takes place among service operators, rms and farm-
ers, where rms need to deliver part of their production by plane. In addition to supplying
aviation and non-aviation services to rms, service operators generate intangible assets that
rms can take advantage of when they are close enough to the airport center. These facilities
are the key factor explaining land distribution. As a result of a maximization process, agents
associate a value to each unit of land. Finally, location is determined by the comparison of
each agents bid-rent function. In this framework, we select a stable land equilibrium involv-
ing service operators, rms and farmers characterized by the Airport-Industrial Park-Rural
Area (A-I-R) spatial sequence, irrespective of the category of airport (cargo or passenger).
Aerotropoli develop around cargo airports when rms use airport services quite inten-
sively and the level of facilities is high. Under these circumstances, service operators peg
more value to land in the case of a passenger-type airport; whereas rms value land more
when the airport is cargo. The size of cargo airports turns out to be smaller than that of
passenger airports while industrial areas are larger and denser in the case of a cargo airport.
Empirical evidence basically supports these theoretical statements.
A direct implication of this type of analysis concerns policy matters. Once the size of
positive e¤ects associated with being close to the airport has been stated, one can think
of the economic e¤ects produced by public policies supporting the creation of aerotropoli.
The economic contribution of air transport in terms of employment and income has im-
portant e¤ects at a regional level. Consequently, regional governments may be interested
in trying to implement the required conditions that allow for the formation of aerotropoli.
Some policy recommendations would suggest fostering logistical platforms close to cargo
airports, promoting and encouraging the partnership between rms and service operators.
In such a framework, the intense collaboration among agents would guarantee a su¢ ciently
high level of facilities to allow for the existence of aerotropoli. Of course, this issue would
also imply to studying to what extent industrial parks are socially desirable and therefore
determining their optimal size. A welfare analysis studying these issues could be an interest-
ing task to undertake in order to extend and apply the main ndings presented in this paper.
Another interesting extension of our framework is to adapt it to studying the impor-
tance of creating logistic and/or industrial areas in the proximity of transport hubs such
as railways stations or harbors. We developed an idea by looking at the specic case of an
airport, but the type of results can easily be extended to other transportation infrastruc-
tures. From a technical viewpoint, such an application would not involve dramatic changes.
Maintaining the suggested structure and changing the parameters of reference and certain
interpretations, our conclusions are expected to hold. However, there is a general lack of
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empirical evidence and statistical data that provides useful support for such an analysis.
The scarcity of data and statistics is one of the most binding problems for providing a
complete analysis of this phenomenon, even in the case of airports. In fact, most of the
analysis that remains to be carried out concerns the empirical analysis of those features
distinguishing aerotropolis-type congurations from other industrial areas. Currently, the
quality of data and lack of complete time series prevents from dealing with complete econo-
metric estimations that would help in measuring the importance of the factors determining
the formation of aeropolitan areas.
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A Appendix: single-crossing condition
The bid-rent function of service operators and that of rms cross at xA (in the cargo case)
and at x0A (in the passenger case). We prove that xA and x
0
A are the only points equalizing
both bid-rent functions (single-crossing condition) by showing that both bid-rent functions
are decreasing and convex.
1. The cargo airport.
In the cargo case, the rst and second derivatives of service operators and rms
bid-rent functions are (12) and (14):
(a) @R
e
a(x)
@x =  
(1  (d c)Ni
d(1 )i )
x2
. This expression is negative for 1 > (d c)Nid(1 ) , which
is always true when Assumption 3 is satised. Therefore Rea(x) is downward
sloping.
(b) @
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x3
. Again by Assumption 3, this expression is positive and
therefore Rea(x) is convex.
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, which is negative and hence Rei (x) is downward
sloping.
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. When  2 (12 ; 1),
which is a necessary condition for an A-I-R-type land equilibrium to arise, the
rst term in the expression is positive and the second one is negative. Therefore,
the expression will be positive when the rst term is higher than the second,
i.e.
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. This is true for  > 14
which is always the case.
2. The passenger airport.
In the passenger case, the rst and second derivatives of service operators and rms
bid-rent functions are (23) and (19):
(a) @R
0e
a (x)
@x =  
(1  (1 )(d c)pT2(1 )
42tNi
)
x2
. This expression is negative for 1 > (1 )pT
2(1 )(d c)
42tNi
,
which is always true when Assumption 30 is satised. Therefore R0ea (x) is down-
ward sloping.
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. Again by Assumption 30, this expression is
positive and therefore R0ea (x) is convex.
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(12 ; 1), the rst term in the expression is negative and the second term positive.
Therefore, the expression will be positive when the rst term is lower than the
second, i.e.
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true for  > 14 which is always the case.
B Appendix: Assumptions 1 and 2
In this appendix we provide the proof that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are always
satised at equilibrium.
 Assumption 1.
Since SA(x) = NaSa(x), by plugging this value into (13), SA(x) becomes:
SeA =
2dtx2
p
. (25)
Assumption 1 states that
p >
dtx2
SA(x)
.
This inequality, by replacing (25), yields p > p2 which is always satised.
 Assumption 2.
Assumption 2 states that

x
> Ra(x).
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Finally, this inequality, by replacing (12), yields Ni(d c)d(1 ) > 0, that is always satised
because both the numerator and the denominator are positive.
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C Appendix: Industrial parks
VIT Distance from Extension Number of
the airport (km) (sqm) rms
Technological Park 7 1,117,000 81
CTV 10 500,000 52
Jundiz 12 4,854,220 307
Goain 18 1,613,190 205
Agurain 31 460,564 12
Asparrena San Millan 36 1,317,700 19
Lantaron 40 827,000 12
Okiturri 36 145,322 6
Table 2: Industrial parks 40 km around VIT
MAD Distance from Extension Number of
the airport (km) (sqm) rms
Ajalvir 14.5 1,234,142 218
Alcalá de Henares 28.8 14,217,882 303
Camarma de Esteruelas 32.9 1,295,480 60
Coslada 11 3,423,062 332
Daganzo de Arriba 27 855,000 105
Los Santos de la Humosa 29.7 407,400 0
Meco 31.1 3,108,704 50
Paracuellos del Jarama 11 821,560 80
San Fernando de Henares 17 2,847,381 382
Torrejón de Ardoz 17.6 3,538,207 330
Torres de la Alameda 31 1,017,577 2
Villalbilla 28 734,750 0
Madrid Municipio 5.5 23,143,842 320
Morata de Tajuña 36 50,019 0
San Martín de la Vega 39 1,515,000 3
Alcobendas 11.4 4,853,124 770
Algete 21.2 2,013,025 180
Cobeña 19 289,970 1
Colmenar Viejo 39.7 1,035,980 144
Fuente el Saz 15.4 285,514 33
S. Sebastián de los Reyes 19 2,491,735 497
San Agustín de Guadalix 27 1,489,496 15
Torrelaguna 53 282,347 0
Tres Cantos 28 3,108,020 109
Boadilla del Monte 35.5 782,400 24
Las Rozas de Madrid 32.2 2,867,473 254
Table 3: Industrial parks 40 km around MAD pooled by town (PART 1)
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MAD Distance from Extension Number of
the airport (km) (sqm) rms
Majadahonda 30.5 388,319 0
Pozuelo de Alarcón 30.7 1,154,369 12
Alcorcón 36.7 5,417,676 397
Fuenlabrada 36.8 7,871,224 985
Getafe 27.2 12,468,213 305
Leganés 30.3 7,433,936 331
Moraleja de Enmedio 34 323,779 3
Navalcarnero 54 1,043,361 0
Parla 38.2 7,116,771 1
Pinto 36.5 3,349,207 259
Valdemoro 39.1 5,795,250 38
Arganda del Rey 31.6 5,611,863 771
Campo Real 34 1,193,950 2
Loeches 26 1,210,700 6
Mejorada del Campo 24.3 1,118,000 8
Rivas Vaciamadrid 28 2,670,675 17
Velilla de San Antonio 31 604,400 3
Table 4: Industrial parks 40 km around MAD pooled by town (PART 2)
CLG Distance from Extension Number of
the airport (km) (sqm) rms
AirLog 8 530,000 10
Airport Business Park 6 815,000 n.a.
JunkersRing 8 380,000 6
Hotel Europa 8 60,000 n.a.
Chemiepark Knapsack 16 1,600,000 18
City Forum 12 320,000 n.a.
Rheinbach Nord 35 300,000 n.a.
Rheincach Nord II 35 206,755 80
Lindlar Klause 35 557,000 112
Wesseling Süd 25 164,000 7
Bonn West 28 255,000 10
Rösrath Ho¤nungsthal 12.7 34,000 1
Alfter Witterschlick 35 82,500 12
Eitorf Alzenbach 35 166,000 24
Bad Honnef Rottbitze 39 160,000 41
Bad Honnef Süd 35 128,300 50
Table 5: Industrial parks 40 km around CLG (PART 1)
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CLG Distance from Extension Number of
the airport (km) (sqm) rms
Bornheim-Kardorf 31 63,100 n.a.
Pullheim Brauweiler 27.7 590,000 70
Brül Ost 16 100,000 n.a.
Engelskirchen Broich 35 35,900 10
Kerpen-Sindorf 35 271,500 7
Frechen Ost 23 1,180,000 46
Erfstadt Gymnich 38 66,500 21
Kerpen-Sindorf 35 350,000 69
Hennef - Hossenberg 28 230,000 1
Hennef - Stadtzentrum 25 46,000 3
Reinbach Nord 35 400,000 n.a.
Hürth - Hermülheim 16 183,100 9
Köln-Buchheim 13 35,000 n.a.
Köln-Ostheim 7 55,000 n.a.
Köln Porz/Eil 5 62,200 n.a.
Köln-Rath/Heumar 6 115,000 n.a.
Königswinter-Niederdoll. 20 257,200 8
Erfstadt Köttingen NW 33 346,800 15
Kürten-Broich 29 112,000 23
Köln-Merkenich 24 510,000 n.a.
Leichlingen West 35 250,000 n.a.
Lohmar Nordwest 10 180,000 32
NeiderKassel Ost 14 100,000 6
Hürth - Hermülheim Ost 16 1,246,900 100
Oveath Hammermühle 26 98,100 9
Oveath Vilkerath 26 6,500 0
Pulheim Süd Ost 27.4 260,000 0
Pulheim Süd Ost (II) 27.5 85,000 20
Rösrath Brand 12 1,195,000 10
Rösrath Lehmbach 14 50,000 6
Ruppichteroth Nord 35 58,800 7
Ruppichteroth Winter. 33 25,500 3
St Augustin Zentrum 15 104,000 n.a.
St Augustin Buisdorf 15 150,000 n.a.
St Augustin Menden 15 360,000 n.a.
St Augustin Menden Süd 15 307,000 n.a.
St Aug. Zentr. BP113 15 22,000 n.a.
Rösrath Vierkotten 10.3 49,500 0
Siegburg Zange 15 246,900 n.a.
Siegburg Zentrum 15 14,900 n.a.
Table 6: Industrial parks 40 km around CLG (PART 2)
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CLG Distance from Extension Number of
the airport (km) (sqm) rms
Siegburg Deichhaus 15 157,000 n.a.
Siegburg Stalberg 15 14,500 n.a.
Erftstadt Lechenich 14 568,100 90
Leichlingen Zentrum NW 35 48,000 n.a.
Leverkusen Steinbüchel 20 29,500 9
Troisdorf Zentrum 10 1,277,500 60
Troisdorf West 12 50,000 30
Leichlingen Zentrum W 35 190,000 n.a.
Alfter Nord 30 126,000 3
Wermelskirchen Ostrin. 36 130,000 n.a.
Wesseling Berzdorf 25 172,300 5
Wesseling NW Berzdorf 30 115,000 1
Köln-Ossendorf 20 26,000 n.a.
Brühl Nord 16 192,000 22
Bergisch Gladbach Hand 20 657,000 9
Köningswinter Oberpleis 25 113,500 n.a.
Bornheim Roisdorf J-P 28 164,600 15
Bornheim Hersel Alex. 28 276,250 n.a.
Bornheim-Sechtem 28 36,000 60
Köningswinter Rutt. 25 200,000 13
Alfter Nord 30 517,700 n.a.
Leverkusen Manfort 20 13,320 3
Table 7: Industrial parks 40 km around CLG (PART 3)
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